Petition

81-1004

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case number _____

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

October 1981 term

In re GILES GALAHAD

On Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and/or the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

GILES GALAHAD,
petitioner pro se
5320 W. 29 Ave.
Denver, Colorado
80214
(303) 238-6779

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1) Does the provision of local rule 1-a of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado that no one shall be generally admitted to practice there who is not admitted to practice in the Colorado state courts, even for one who is admitted to other district and appellate federal courts and the courts of other states and whose previous practice has been essentially exclusively in the federal courts, violate the Privileges and Immunities clauses of Section 2 of Article IV, and the 14th Amendment to, the United States Constitution?

2) Is this provision contrary to the spirit and general intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts?

3) Is this provision contrary to the intent of this court as expressed in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 1963, where this Court upheld the right of a patent agent to practice before the U,S. Patent Office without being admitted to practice in the state courts of his state of residence?

4) Are United States District Court Local Rules reviewable in any manner whatsoever?

RELIEF SOUGHT

1) Sought is a Writ of Prohibition to United States District Court Judge Zita L. Weinshienk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, to cease the application to petitioner of the exclusionary clause of District Court Local Rule 1-a requiring admission to practice in the Colorado state courts as a prerequisite to his general admission to practice in the District Court.

2) Sought is a Writ of Mandamus to all judges of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to consider as eligible for general admission to practice there all those admitted to any other federal District or Appellate court and/or the courts of any State, who are either residing or maintaining an office in Colorado.

3) Sought is a Writ of Mandamus to judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Robert H. McWilliams, Jean S. Breitenstein, and William E. Doyle to consider District Court Local Rules reviewable and actions taken by District Court judges under Local Rules as being final for purposes of review, particularly with respect to petitioner's motion for admission to practice before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado which was denied under District Court Local Rule 1-a.

ALL PERSONS AGAINST WHOM RELIEF IS SOUGHT

Judge Zita L. Weinshienk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, particularly; essentially though, all judges of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, comprising;

Judge Weinshienk;

Judge Winner, Chief Judge;

Judge Matsch;

Judge Kane;

Judge Finesilver;

Judge Chilson;

Judge Carrigan; and

Judge Arraj

and the following three judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:

Judge McWilliams;

Judge Breitenstein; and

Judge Doyle.

WHY THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN ANY OTHER COURT

Petitioner's motion for admission to practice before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado was denied by District Judge Zita L. Weinshienk on 2 July 1981, (appendix herein, page 43).

Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to District Judge Zita L. Weinshienk was denied on 16 October 1981, (appendix, p. 44).

Consequently, the only avenue open to petitioner to possibly bring about the immediate resumption of his profession is by way of this petition.

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JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

Petitioner's petition to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was denied on 16 October 1981, case no. 81-1782.

Petitioner's motion for admission to the District Court in Denver was denied on 2 July 1981, case no. 81-X-137.

Jurisdiction of this court in this matter is authorized by 28 U,S.C. 1651(a).

Pertinent Rules and Constitutional Items

Rule 1-a of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado:

> The bar of this court shall consist of those persons admitted to practice before it. Persons admitted to practice in the courts of the State of Colorado and residing or maintaining an office in Colorado, may be admitted to the bar of this Court upon motion of a member of the bar of the Court representing that the applicant is of good moral character. Each person admitted to the bar of this Court must take the prescribed oath, must sign the roll of attorneys, and must pay the prescribed fee.
> (emphasis supplied)

Section 2, Article IV, United States Constitution; states:

> The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several States.

The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution; states:

> No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United States.

* * *

Considerations Governing the Issuance of Extraordinary Writs

a) The issuance of this (these) writ (writs) will be in aid of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. The District Court Local Rule 1-a herein challenged is clearly at variance with the purported independence of the federal judiciary from the state judiciaries. Rule 1-a discards a federally-practicing lawyer's right to pursue his profession in the federal courts upon his changing his state of residence

upon the delays and whimsies of that new state's licensing board.

b) There are present exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of this Court's discretionary powers. Petitioner is a patent lawyer experienced in private practice registered and in good standing with the United States Patent Office, and admitted to and in good standing to practice before the courts of Pennsylvania and Alaska, and before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. His integrity simply cannot and does not permit him to destroy his character by acquiescing in the peculiarly egregious non-licensing of him by the Colorado Supreme Court due to their blatantly non-intelligent administration of their bar examination, currently the object of

Civil Action No. 81-M-1104 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. (A study of previous reported cases in this area shows a rather low probability of petitioner prevailing in that suit.) Thus because of Rule 1-a, petitioner shall not ever be permitted to practice his profession, an essentially exclusively federal one in nature, in the federal courts, where he has previously practiced. This is non-intelligent, unjust, and illegal.

c) Adequate relief cannot be had in any other form or from any other court. With the denial of petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on 16 October 1981, the only avenue currently left open to petitioner to avoid the loss of his hard-earned, high-valued profession is this petition. The Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals in this matter has essentially found District Court Local Rules non-reviewable and non-appealable by the mandamus route, which essentially means not at all, since Justice Delayed is Justice Denied. The current present loss <u>now</u> to the profession and to the public of petitioner, one of the relatively few sincerely conscientious lawyers about who values his integrity more than his hard-won profession, his character more than his wallet, cannot be overestimated. Companion case No. 81-1205 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, a civil suit by petitioner against respondent Judge Weinshienk on this same matter, has yet to be assigned to a Judge, all Colorado federal judges having excused themselves.

The actuality of the present situation is that by means of Rule 1-a,

the abject indecency by which lawyers in this Nation are currently impeded from changing their state of residence by barbaric anachronistic state licensing procedures is carried over to the federal judicial system and thereby degenerates it. It is of immediate importance that this is stopped <u>now</u>.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

FACTS

This is a petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition to issue from this Court to Judge Zita L. Weinshienk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado because of that Judge's denial of Petitioner's motion for admission to practice before that court,(case number there 81-X-137)(appendix, p.43); and to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because of their refusal to consider such a judicial action reviewable, (case number there 81-1782)(appendix, p.44).

Petitioner is currently suing in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado the Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado State Biard of Law Examiners to have them acknowledge that Petitioner passed the July 1980 Colorado Bar Examination; (case number

there 81-M-1104); currently awaiting a judicial decision on the cross motions to dismiss the case and for summary judgment which resulted from the Colorado Supreme Court repealing (not however with respect to Petitioner) the irrational grading standard which precipitated this entire affair.

Petitioner is a 34-year old male, a citizen of the United States and of the State of Colorado. He is a member of the bar in good standing in both Pennsylvania and Alaska, and of the United States District Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. He has successfully practiced law as an associate in a law firm in Pennsylvania for two and a third years.

Petitioner has been residing in Colorado since 6 March 1980 and intends

to continue to reside in Colorado and intends to practice law in Colorado to the extent he is not prevented from doing so or is required to sacrifice his integrity in order to do so.

Regardless of the outcome of the suit against the Colorado Supreme Court, Petitioner shall not ever again sit for another bar examination, either in Colorado or elsewhere, Petitioner's eyes finally having been opened to the fraudulentness of such a system of attorney licensing.

The first phrase of the second sentence of Rule 1-a of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (herein p.11) restricts admission to practice before the District Court to those admitted to practice before the Colroado courts.

Thus it is quite possible that the

situation will continue forever which exists now, that Petitioner is permanently residing in Colorado, is not licensed to practice law in the Colorado courts, and therefore is not considered eligible to be admitted to the bar of the United States District Court because of the exclusionary clause of Rule 1-a, which is the place where he would essentially exclusively be practicing as a patent lawyer.

REASONS WHY THE WRITS SHOULD ISSUE

RULE 1-a VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE IV OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A citizen of these United States has to be essentially deaf, dumb and blind to the world about him not to be aware, dramatically aware, of the mobility of the people who constitute the present society of these United States of America. It is a readily observable fact, to those who take the

time and trouble to even momentarily open their eyes, that the majority of the working force in this nation today has permanently resided in more than one state in their working years. Especially those who work for the large corporations or in seasonal occupations, who rarely spend any length of time anywhere. Even lawyers, especially those who work for the corporations.

Any impediments to that vast mobility of the people of these United States necessarily impedes the smooth functioning of this society and sends its ripples of inefficiency and wastage of human resources throughout this society in successive waves of magnification, resulting in the current national decline in productivity, inflation, exorbitant interest rates, unemployment, violence, and general malaise.

Rule 1-a is such an impediment. The intensity of these rippling waves of magnified inefficiency and wastage is proportional to the strategicness of that sector of this society that is subject to that impediment to the smooth functioning of this society. In the incredible complexity of modern society, lawyers are crucial to the smooth fundtioning of this society, and impediments to the mobility of lawyers, such as Rule 1-a, produce a magnified rippling wave of inefficiency and wastage of incredible intensity which reverberates through and through this society causing tremendous damage.

It was precisely to prevent this wastage of human resources and this societal inefficiency that the Privileges and Immunities clause were placed and has remained in the United States Constitution. "The Citizens of

each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States." "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of The United States." are an emphatic ennunciation that this is indeed one Nation and one People and no longer a confederacy of mistrust.

To require, as does Rule 1-a, that a member of the bar of a federal court who moves to the jurisdiction of another federal court must first secure admission to the bar of the courts of the State within which that second federal court is located before he can practice in that second federal court, even in a case where that lawyer's practice is essentially exclusively federal in nature such as that of Petitioner's patent law; is precisely the type of wastage and inefficiency which it was

and is the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities clauses of the United States Constitution to prevent; and is precisely what contributes in no small measure to the current profound degeneration of the profession, the nation, and humanity in general.

The privilege of pursuing one's vocation, and the corresponding immunity from impediments thereto, are one of the most obvious of the Privileges and Immunities that are the essence of national citizenship.

> "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union,... ...The right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, <u>professional pursuits</u>, or otherwise;..."

> Justice Washington, in the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed.Cas.546, 550 (No.3230), (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1823) (emphasis supplied)

and:

> "There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less than the sacred right of labor."
>
> Judge Bradley, in the case of Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Cresent City Slaughter-House Co., 15 Fed.Cas.649,652 (No.8408)(C.C.D. La.1870).

The molestation of Petitioner by Rule 1-a in the lawful pursuit of his profession clearly violates these clauses of the United States Constitution. It has thrown Petitioner's right to practice in the Federal Courts at the mercy of the vicissitudes of Colorado state bar admission practices.

RULE 1-a VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The discarding by Rule 1-a of

Petitioner's right to practice his profession in the Federal Courts upon the mercies of the Colorado state bar admission practices violates the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that under color of State law, Petitioner's constitutional right to practice his profession in the Federal Courts is denied.

With respect to the purpose of this clause of the Constitution:

> "The purpose is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States ONE PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall understand and appreciate the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged by State authority; that State laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, property from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all. Thus, as the great personal rights of each and every person were established and guarded, a reasonable confidence that there would be good government might seem to be justified. The amendment embodies all that the statesmanship of the country has conceived for accommo-

> dating the Constitution and the institutions of the country to the vast additions of territory, increase of the population, multiplication of States and Territorial governments, the annual influx of aliens, and the mighty changes produced by revolutionary events, and by social, industrial, commercial development. It is an act of Union, an act to determine the reciprocal relations of the millions of population within the bounds of the United States--the numerous State governments and the entire United States administered by a common government--that they might mutually sustain, support, and co-operate for the promotion of peace, security and the assurance of property and liberty....."
>
> former Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, in his argument to the Supreme Court in the case of Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,45 (1873), as reported in the law review article by Phillip B. Kurtland on the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 405, 411.

And further on the purpose of this clause:

> "This clause was adopted to make United States citizenship the dominent and paramount allegiance among us. The return which the law had long associated with allegiance was protection. The power of citizenship as a shield against oppression was widely known from

> the example of Paul's Roman citizenship, which sent the centurion scurrying to his higher-ups with the message: 'Take heed what thou doest, for this man is a Roman.' I suppose none of us doubts that the hope of imparting to American citizenship some of this vitality was the purpose of declaring in the Fourteenth Amendment; 'Allpersons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.....'.."
>
> Mr. Justice Jackson, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941)

RULE 1-a IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AS EXPRESSED IN THE CASE OF SPERRY V. FLORIDA, 373 U.S. 379, (1963)

Sperry v. Florida involved the overturning of a Florida Supreme Court injunction against the practice of his profession by a registered U.S. Patent Office agent in Florida as being the unauthorized practice of law since he was not admitted to practice before the Florida courts,

this Court holding that a State does not have the power to deny a citizen the exercise of a federal right, particularly to prevent a Patent Agent from representing United States citizens in Florida before the U.S. Patent Office.

Petitioner is a patent lawyer, registered and in good standing before the United States Patent and Trademark Office; and is licensed and in good standing as an attorney at law in the states of Pennsylvania and Alaska; and also the United States District Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner's right to practice his profession in the Federal Courts cannot be impeded by State regulation. If Petitioner wishes to change his state of residence annually indefinitely, then that is his right to do so, and it is his further right to practice his pro-

fession in each new state of residence immediately upon arrival there, without the impediment of State bar licensing procedures. The practice of patent law, and federal law in general, is a federal right, not a matter for state regulation through abdication of responsibility by a federal court. Patent law is conducted essentially exclusively in the federal courts, and has a negligible amount to do at best with the state courts. The apparent intent of this Court in the Sperry case is that there is to be no State (or federal abdication to State) interference with the practice of patent law, or federal law in general.

RULE 1-a IS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

Such obstacles as Rule 1-a attempt to return the federal judiciary to the era of conformity with state procedure

that it was a principal purpose of the Civil Rules to end. Such rules as Rule 1-a undermine the whole concept of an independent federal system, and ignore the quest for uniformity, simplicity, and scarcity embodied in the Civil Rules of Procedure.

> "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of local proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules."
>
> Judge Wisdom in Lumberman's Mut. Cas. v. Wright, 322 Fed.2nd. 759, 764 (CA 5, 1963); quoted by Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472-3, (1965); reported in note 55, 67 Col. L.R. 1251,1261.

As stated by Judge Friendly in the case of Spanos v. Skouras, 10 Fed.Rul.Ser. 1066, (CA 2, 1966):

> ",..; one of the very purposes of federal jurisdiction is to protect

> against state policies that fail to recognize the extent to which the many have become one."

And, more recently, in an opinion by Justice Dimond of the Alaska Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Alaska Bar Assn., 620 Pac.2nd. 640, 641-3, where the Alaska Supreme Court struck down the 30-day residency requirement to take theAlaska Bar examination:

> We agree with the New York Court of Appeals, and the commentators, that the practice of law by qualified persons is a "fundamental right" triggering scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental right to engage in "common callings" and to pursue "ordinary livelihoods". The Court has protected under the privileges and immunities clause, the right to fish, to market goods, and to be employed in jobs arising from state oil and gas leases. Assuming that there was once a status distinction between engaging in common occupations and in professional pursuits, it is not of constitutional significance.....(then quoting Corfield v. Coryell)... (citations omitted)

And previously, quoting from Toomer v. Whitsell, 334 U.S.385,394-96:

> The primary purpose of this clause, ...was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, soverign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy. For protection of such equality the citizen of State A was not to be restricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation. Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists, (cite omitted)...
> In line with this underlying purpose, it was long ago decided that one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.

And then, on page 646:

> "...We believe that the bar residency requirement is the sort of economic protectionism that the privileges and immunities clause of The United States Constitution was

designed to prevent."

Likewise, with respect to Local Rule 1-a of the District Court for Colorado.

RULE 1-a IS REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT THROUGH THIS MANDAMUS PETITION

Application of Wasserman, 240 Fed. 2nd 213, 23 Fed.Rul.Ser. 802 to the contrary; if Local Rules are not reviewable then it becomes a most sad affair that administrators of justice have insulated their own activities against that justice.

In this matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed the Wasserman case, a Ninth Circuit case from 1956 which held a rule similar to Rule 1-a denial of a motion for admission non-reviewable. The essence of the rationale for the decision in Wasserman comes from the following:

> "The danger that some attorney, who has been admitted to the bar in some state which inadequately tested his professional standards of ethics, in-

> tegrity and knowledge or who subsequently was guilty of unprofessional conduct there, might be admitted to practice law in California by admission generally to the United States District in the latter state is a grave one....
> "In view of the notorious fact that lawyers whose qualities of acts have made them persona non-grata in one s te, where they may have been admitted to the courts, tend to migrate to another state where they are not as well-known, the individual courts are faced with a tremendous problem in screening applicants for admission...." (pages 805-06) (1956)

That case was decided in 1956. It must be obvious today, 25 years later, that the rapid accurate transmission of information from one part of the country to the other which apparently did not exist for the court of Wasserman in 1956, and which most dramatically does exist today, vitiates completely the above-quoted rationale. All it takes today is a phone call to find out precisely just what a lawyer's activities were in any other state. And what his previous

professional qualifications and performance were. It is merely a question of opening one's eyes to the wealth of information available; and taking the time to face actualities rather than staying lost in the pursuit of concepts.

But we all know, do we not, the true reason, of course, for such obstacles to a changing of the state ofresidence of a lawyer,as the inane re-examinations on law school material, and Rule 1-a. It continues to be the concealed spirit of monopolistic exclusion of an antitrust violation nature which has corrupted, and continues to corrupt the moral fiber of the American legal profession for quite some time now, with no visible signs of abatement.

JUSTICE IS A CONCEPTUAL APPROXIMATION TO INTELLIGENCE; LAW IS A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO JUSTICE

Is not justice a conceptual approximation to intelligence? In the presence of intelligence, is not justice superfluous? Is not law a theoretical approach to justice? In the presence of justice, is not law superfluous?

Clearly so.

The complete absence of intelligence, justice, and law produces intense disorder. The labor of those involved in the law is at best towards the elevation and maintenance of the society of mankind above and away from this disorder. Necessarily then, all efforts of those in the law are, at best, their very rare best, still two steps removed from intelligence.

A clear continuous awareness of this would result in a healthy humility in those who administer the law which

would avert their escalation of the importance of law above that of justice and intelligence.

Such an awareness would also bring about an immediate realization of the fact that professional competence is, and always has been, a matter of character, not intellect. The absence of competence, incompetence, simply occurs whenever one has not taken the time, expended the energy, or made the effort sufficient to result in the job being well done; including passing on to others a task one has not the capacity to handle. Competence therefore results from character. Thus, the elevation of the level of competence in the profession, can necessarily be achieved through no means other than the elevation and non-deterioration of the level of character in the profession.

It takes no more than a glance to

see clearly that restrictions on the free movement of lawyers across the nation distinctly deteriorates the character of those within the profession by either inculcating within them through example the greater importance of form over substance, or planting within them the seed of suspicion that those who administer the profession regard themselves as being beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. Either way, the elevation of the importance of form over substance or the decline of respect for the administrators of the profession leads inevitably to a deterioration of character to the point of a non-interest in putting more into a job than the minimum which will enable the matter to slide by; which attitude is the essence of incompetence.

How has this all come about? No doubt due to the fact that the legal

profession is predominantly a clerical one, not an intellectual nor a dynamic one. It assists people in their interpersonal affairs. It neither initiates nor creates anything. For some unknown reason, no doubt cultural, the vast majority of those in the legal profession do not find their beneficial assistance to the public sufficiently emotionally satisfying. And they therefore take great pains to cultivate an artificial mystique of intellectual superiority and societal elitism around themselves, no doubt following the lamentable example of the physicians. And it is this artificially created air of superiority, rather than their beneficial assistance to humanity, in which they take immense pleasure and justification for existence. From this distorted outlook on life comes the bar between the lawyers and the public; comes the pompous bar exam-

inations (requiring the use of Latin phrases for passage thereof) on material at best of negligible import to the daily practice of a lawyer; comes the insufferably egotistical re-examination required in each State; comes the profound degeneration of the profession.

For a State not to give Full Faith and Credit to the Judicial Proceedings by which a lawyer became licensed to practice in another State upon that lawyer moving to the new State, is a shameful act of arrogant vanity. And when that new State further impedes that lawyer with monopolistic exclusionary devices which require him to reduce himself to the level of a circus animal jumping through hoops, it is an absolute disgrace to the profession. But when the federal courts themselves acquiesce and encourage this type of activity by means of such abominations as Rule 1-a,

then the matter becomes a pronounced atrocity.

To discard the right to practice in the federal courts, for a lawyer who changes residence to another State, upon the delays and vicissitudes of the licensing procedures of that State's judiciary, is not only illegal, not only unjust, but blatantly non-intelligent...

GILES GALAHAD
petitioner pro se
5320 W. 29 Ave,
Denver, CO 80214
(303) 238-6779

16 Nov 81

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 81-X-137

In the matter of

GILES GALAHAD,

Petitioner

MINUTE ORDER

Dated: July 2, 1981

ORDER ENTERED BY JUDGE ZITA L. WEINSHIENK

Joan E. Boline, Secretary

Petitioner's Motion for immediate admission is DENIED.

SEPTEMBER TERM - October 16, 1981

Before Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, Honorable Jean S. Breitenstein and Honorable William E. Doyle, Circuit Judges.

In the matter of	)	
	)	
GILES GALAHAD,	)	No. 81-1782
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	
	)	
ZITA L. WEINSHIENK,	)	
	)	
Individually and as a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

This matter comes on for consideration of a petition for writ of mandamus. The court also has respondent's response filed pursuant to court order.

Upon consideration whereof the petition is denied. See Application of Wasserman, 240 F2d 213 (9th Cir. 1956).

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